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Abstract—This research study was conducted to illustrate how
it is easily possible to get data access to disabled or blocked
repositories in Github using GraphQL. There are situations in
which you can lose access to your Github repositories; When
you use the paid version of Github services and do not pay
the monthly payment or another situation is that when you use
Github from the countries in the United States sanction list.
Having an insecure repository with malicious usages can also
put your repository in Github blacklist. In all of these situations,
Github will block and disable your repository and you will lose
access to your files, codes and project assets. Here, we will discuss
the procedure of how an Ethical Hacker can gain access to all
those blocked data with GraphQL functionality.
Index Terms—security, web services, data exposure, graphql,
query language, rest, api, restful, broken access control
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 2019, GitHub, the worlds largest host of source
code, confirmed that they blocked private repositories of users
in Iran, Syria, and Crimea after blocking developers from
Cuba and North Korea, due to the impact of the U.S. trade
restrictions and sanctions. After this, developers from these
countries lost their access over their codes and files on Github
Servers. Similarly, organizations that do not pay their monthly
payment, Github will disable their repositories too.
In this security research paper, we will illustrate how did we
investigate and collect data from Github Mobile Application
to find GitHub private GraphQL queries and how simply users
can bypass the Github security check to gain their inaccessible
data back. Also, we will discuss ways of overcoming these
issues.
II. APIS AND API ABUSE
A contract between a client and a server is called an API.
The most popular API abuse is begun with the fact that each
side fails to honor their side of the contract. In this scenario,
the client violates the server by assuming its behavior [1]. It is
also possible to violate the client-server contract if the client
could access unwanted information on the server-side.
Two of the main types of well-known APIs are REST
API [2] and GraphQL. Recently GraphQL is introduced and
open-sourced by Facebook. It is a conceptual framework for
giving a new model of data access interface on the Web
which is increasingly embraced in online services [3]. The
framework involves an original graph query language and a
query compiler on each side of an API service (caller and
callee) to request and understand the required data.
Github is starting to adopt GraphQL as an alternative way
to access their web services. Github GraphQL has adequate
documentation, although Github implementation of GraphQL
does not seems to have all of the features of their RESTful
API right now.
III. DATA GATHERING
The initial step toward finding a way to gain access is
collecting data. The new Github iOS Mobile Application
which is now in Public Preview is the only possible way to see
disabled repositories directory. The app can not open Binary
files and download any file. Thus, by capturing the mobile
application communication data we can understand the process
of accessing repository structure and non-binary files, but not
binary files. After analyzing transferred data we will try to
replicate those calls on our application to make backup files
from lost data.
Using a well-known penetration test [4] method called ”Man
In The Middle” let us set up a proxy between the application
and Github Server to collect data transfer between them.
Pen-testing is necessary for recognizing non-functional access
controls. A security attack that the hacker secretly transfers
and probably modifies the communication between two parties
who assume they are directly talking with each other, is called
the Man-In-The-Middle or MITM attack [5].
Initially, we start with popular client applications, Github
Desktop and FastHub for Android, but all of them are based
on Github REST API. In our knowledge, Github RESTful
API is well tested and it is not possible to gain unwanted
data and requests end up failing after trying to access disabled
repositories.
However, after publishing the first public preview version
of the Github iOS application, We immediately find the
difference which is the possibility to see repositories directory
and GraphQL backend to communicate with the server in this
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application. To set up the MITM environment for our scenario,
we add a proxy in the middle of Mobile client and Github
servers using a reputable penetration tool called Burp-Suite [6]
and due to the use of SSL for network communication inside
the application, we installed CA Certificate (Certification Au-
thority) via iOS Trusted Profile. After successfully capturing
communication packets, we collect data related to disabled
repositories and we discovered there is a lack of security check
and policy control in GraphQL.
IV. DATA UNDERSTANDING
GraphQL is a newly introduced a conceptual framework
for implementing a new way of data access interface with a
new graph query language [7]. By analyzing the requests and
responses data, we can breakdown the messages into two main
parts, header and body.
Inside the header, we can find request method, host and
destination, GraphQL Apollo Operation or Function name,
Authorization and other information.
POST /graphql HTTP/1.1
Host: api.github.com
Content-Type: application/json
X-APOLLO-OPERATION-NAME: RepoFiles
GraphQL-Features: pe_mobile
User-Agent: GitHub/1.0.0
Authorization: Bearer XXXX
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US;q=1.0
And in the body segment, we can see the GraphQL the
request or the response of the request in JSON. Inside request
body operationName clarifies which GraphQL operation
must run, query is our demanded GraphQL query to provide
data and variables declares variables which it is required
in our query. And inside the response body, we receive data
which requested data asked via GraphQL query.
Fig. 1. JSON Request containing GraphQL Query
V. DATA ACCESS
As our result shows, when trying to access the disabled
repository, REST API abort our request. In our assumption,
there must be a layer of security and policy check between
database and REST API service, which handles security
tasks.[Figure2].
According to our analysis, using GraphQL queries will not
be rejected by GitHub servers when trying to reach disabled
repositories. Our research shows that GraphQL service is not
using the same security layer as REST service uses. So this
will allow us to bypass security checks and access blocked
files and disabled repositories [Figure3].
Thus with the aid of Official Github GraphQL documen-
tation, we can develop a program to access the directory of
disabled repositories.
But what about files? Github divides Files or Blobs into
two distinct types, Non-Binary and Binary files. Non-binary
blobs are records like texts and codes, but pictures, exe, dll,
... files are considered binary files. Now we will discuss how
it is possible to access these two types of files.
Fig. 2. RestApi Sequence Model
Fig. 3. GraphQL Sequence Model
A. Non-Binary Files
Using Public Github GraphQL features, it is possible to
access non-binary data easily. We are only required to cast
the object to blob and call its’ text property. This query will
return the encoded blob content inside the response JSON.
After decoding the response we can save it in memory.
Fig. 4. GraphQL Query to access Non-Binary Files
B. Binary Files
After our initial attempt to access binary files, we discovered
due to unknown reasons the mobile application is reaching
the files using their URLs directly, which we can not access.
For more investigation, we downgraded our mobile application
version to the very first public preview build. We observed
that at that version, GitHub tried to get binary files using
"file(path){contentHTML}" GraphQL query which is
not mentioned inside Github Online Documents. We decided
to use this function with our access token, taken from Github
Developer settings, but it did not work. It appears, Github
is using this private function for its application and it is not
available for the public.
For each server request via Github API, Access Token for
Authentication is needed. Inside captured transferred data, in
the header section of the request is a line for Authorization.
Which this section ends with "Bearer" and a forty char-
acters length Access Token or Client Secret that this is the
token Github generates for developers or applications gets it
after users authorize themselves.
Assume that authentication token is available, Here, we
adopted OctoKit.GraphQL.Net Library1, to write this piece
of code for generating GraphQL Queries and sending query
requests to Github servers. To apply the unreleased and
unsupported private function of Github GraphQL, it is easily
possible to force our function into query by simply injecting
string inside the compiled query.
Quickly, with Breadth-first traversing in the directory tree
and downloading files, we can fully restore our disabled
repository.
C. Authentication Token
In our security research, we found out that there are two
types of Client Secret Tokens. One which is publicly available
1OctoKit.GraphQL.Net is the Official client library for Github GraphQL
for DotNet.
Fig. 5. C# Code Accessing Image File
for developers and applications to use, and the private tokens
which Github is using for it their Mobile Application to access
GraphQL private functions. The "file" function is a private
GraphQL function that allows Github Mobile Application to
get binary files inside the server response. Using this query
in our system is only possible by high jacking Github Access
Token.
Accessing the token is possible by mimicking the exact
behavior of the Github Official Application. If we track the
login process in the mobile application we can figure out that
/login/oauth/access_token route will give us Client
Secret after user login to their account if we provide proper
"client_id" and "code". Another important thing that
we have to take into consideration is that GitHub servers
will return authentication data to users’ mobile to a specific
URI or Activation Protocol, in which the Operating System
will respond to the specific application on the phone which
is registered with that protocol. In this case, Github shows
the redirecting URI on the login page, and in this case, it
is github://com.github.ios. So, by having all this
information, we can develop a twin application, with the
authentication process, to get the Security Token.
VI. PATCH
In the following years, security flaws similar to this problem
probably will be seen more than often and especially with the
growth in usage of GraphQL among developers and increase
in GraphQL adoption in API services. We have to be alert
while transporting security and policy checks from RESTful
API to GraphQL.
One of the fundamental solutions for this specific issue
could be, Handling security checks on the Database Manage-
ment System side. Depending on the structure and architecture
of the system, this might be efficient for some systems due to
the separation of sub-systems or it might not be proper for
specific cases.
Alternative method would be adding another layer after
REST API and GraphQL layers, therefore a central subsystem
layer handles data transition so that it will be possible to dictate
our policies directly on this layer.
Encryption of information at rest and in transition can
benefit you comply with information security regulations [8].
”End-to-end” encryption method can be the ultimate solution
for such matters. Although, Limitations of this method have
been already known; The End-to-end encryption approach is
not enough to stop compromising of data in a network that
operates on untrusted sub-net processors [9]. Also, timing
and message lengths of deliveries will have a straight effect
on the speed of receiving and decryption of data. Therefore
end-to-end encryption is beneficial for Super Confidential
scenarios, however, it may not be practically efficient for
general purposes.
OWASP or The Open Web Application Security Project [8]
is a non-profit organization committed to providing honest,
realistic information about application safety and security.
The ”OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks” [8]
guides programmers and security experts on the common
important vulnerabilities which are generally observed in web
applications, which are also simple to exploit.
The fifth most commonly security issue inside OWASP Top
10 list is ”Broken Access Control”. It means, Inadequately
configured constraints on verified users enable them to obtain
unauthorized information or functionality, such as inspecting
sensitive documents and access rights. Hackers can exploit and
get unauthorized access and/or data, such as access to other
users’ records, view sensitive files, etc [8]. Now we can assume
that this Github GraphQL security problem is in the category
of Broken Access Control.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, with studying the communication traffic
between the application and Github servers, we were able to
access Github private GraphQL queries and restore all of the
files inside our disabled repository as a result of a security
design flaw in Github GraphQL service.
It is now clear that soon, many security problems will be
witnessed similarly in other services. Security researchers must
be concerned about how to find and prevent such problems
from happening in the future. It is hoped that this research
will excite further investigations in this area.
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